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Abstract
When identifying relative value opportunities across credit and equity
markets, the arbitrageur faces two major problems, namely positions based
on model misspecication and mismeasured inputs. Using credit default
swap data, this paper addresses both concerns in a convergence-type trad-
ing strategy. In spite of di¤erences in assumptions governing default and
calibration, we nd the exact structural model linking the markets second
to timely key inputs. Studying an equally-weighted portfolio of all rela-
tive value positions, the excess returns are insignicant when based on a
traditional volatility from historical equity returns. However, relying on an
implied volatility from equity options results in a substantial gain in strategy
execution and highly signicant excess returns - even when small gaps are
exploited. The gain is largest in the speculative grade segment, and cannot
be explained from systematic market risk factors. Although the strategy
may seem attractive at an aggregate level, positions on individual obligors
can be very risky.
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1 Introduction
Capital structure arbitrage refers to trading strategies that take advantage of the
relative mispricing across di¤erent security classes traded on the same capital
structure. As the exponential growth in the credit default swap (CDS) market
has made credit much more tradable and traditional hedge fund strategies have
su¤ered declining returns (Skorecki (2004)), important questions arise for hedge
funds and proprietary trading desks. In particular, do credit and equity markets
ever diverge in opinion on the quality of an obligor? What is the risk and return of
exploiting divergent views in relative value strategies? Although trading strategies
founded in a lack of synchronicity between equity and credit markets have gained
huge popularity in recent years (Currie & Morris (2002) and Zuckerman (2005)),
the academic literature addressing capital structure arbitrage is very sparse.
This paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of the risk and return of capi-
tal structure arbitrage using CDS data on 221 North American obligors in 2002
to 2004. When looking at one security in order to signal the sale or purchase of
another, the resulting link and initiation of a trade depends on the chosen model.
We address two major problems facing the arbitrageur, namely relative value op-
portunities driven by model misspecication or mismeasured inputs.
Duarte, Longsta¤&Yu (2005) analyze traditional xed income arbitrage strate-
gies such as the swap spread arbitrage, but also briey address capital structure
arbitrage. Yu (2006) cites a complete lack of evidence in favor of or against strate-
gies trading equity instruments against CDSs. Hence, he conducts the rst analy-
sis of the strategy by implementing the industry benchmark CreditGrades using a
historical volatility, which is a popular choice among professionals.1
We show that the more comprehensive model by Leland & Toft (1996) only
adds an excess return of secondary order. However, when exploiting a wider array
of inputs and securities in model calibration and identication of relative value
opportunities, the result is a substantial improvement in strategy execution and
returns.
When searching for relative value opportunities, the arbitrageur uses a struc-
tural model to gauge the richness and cheapness of the 5-year CDS spread. Using
the market value of equity, an associated volatility measure and the liability struc-
ture of the obligor, he compares the spread implied from the model with the market
1That CreditGrades is the preferred framework among professionals is argued in Currie &
Morris (2002) and Yu (2006), while the CreditGrades Technical Document by Finger (2002)
advocates for the 1000-day historical volatility.
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spread. When the market spread is substantially larger(smaller) than the theoret-
ical counterpart, he sells(buys) a CDS and sells(buys) equity. If the market and
equity-implied spread from the model subsequently converge he prots. Hence, the
model helps identify credits that either o¤er a discount against equities or trade
at a very high level.
As pointed out in Duarte et al. (2005), capital structure arbitrage hinges on
models that can explain the link between securities with di¤erent characteristics.
In fact, the chosen underlying model plays a central role in all parts of the strategy.
First, it is used to calculate equity-implied CDS spreads governing entry and exit
decisions in equity and credit markets. Second, to calculate daily returns on an
open position, it is necessary to keep track on the total value of an outstanding
CDS position. This is done from the model-based term structure of survival prob-
abilities. Third, the model is used to calculate the equity hedge by a numerical
di¤erentiation of the value of the CDS position wrt. the equity price.
CreditGrades loosely builds on Black & Cox (1976), with default dened as
the rst passage time of rm assets to an unobserved default barrier. This model,
like other structural models, is based on a set of restrictive assumptions regarding
the default mechanism and capital structure characteristics.
Although allowing for a random recovery, CreditGrades belongs to the class of
models with an exogenous default barrier. However, Leland (1994) subsequently
extended in Leland & Toft (1996) has pioneered models with endogenous default.
In these models, the default barrier is chosen by managers as the asset value where
it is no longer optimal for the equityholders to meet the promised debt service
payments. Hence, the default barrier is determined not only by debt principal,
but also by asset volatility, debt maturity, payout rates and tax rates etc.
As a result of model variations, di¤erences in model calibration exist. For
structural models, this is particularly relevant as many key inputs are di¢ cult
to measure. Bypassing strict denitions CreditGrades is developed for immedi-
ate application, while the calibration of Leland & Toft (1996) is more extensive.
Hence, the number and characteristics of parameters to be estimated, as well as
the method to infer the underlying asset value process and default barrier, di¤er
across models.
Duarte et al. (2005) and Yu (2006) solely rely on CreditGrades calibrated with a
1000-day historical volatility. When based on a large divergence between markets,
both nd that capital structure arbitrage is protable on average. At the aggregate
level, the strategy appears to o¤er attractive Sharpe ratios and a positive average
return with positive skewness. Yet, individual positions can be very risky and most
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losses occur when the arbitrageur shorts CDSs but subsequently nd the market
spread rapidly increasing and the equity hedge ine¤ective.
Due to the substantial di¤erences in model assumptions and calibration, the key
observed gap between the market and model spread fueling the arbitrageur may be
driven by model misspecication. Furthermore, key inputs may be mismeasured
sending the arbitrageur a false signal of relative mispricing. Hence, there is a need
to understand how the risk and return vary with model choice and calibration.
These caveats are unexplored in Duarte et al. (2005) and Yu (2006).
We address these two problems facing the arbitrageur, and study how the
characteristics of capital structure arbitrage vary with model choice and asset
volatility calibration. For this purpose, we apply the CreditGrades model and
Leland & Toft (1996). As the volatility measure is a key input to the pricing of
credit, we identify relative value opportunities from a traditional 250-day historical
volatility used extensively in the bond pricing literature, and a volatility measure
implied from equity options.
Based on anecdotal evidence using CreditGrades, Finger & Stamicar (2005a)
and Finger & Stamicar (2005b) show how model spreads based on historical volatil-
ities lag the market when spreads increase, while overpredicting the market as
spreads recover. However, the more responsive option-implied volatility substan-
tially improves the pricing performance. Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout & Wein-
baum (2006) and Cao, Yu & Zhong (2006) analyze the information content of eq-
uity options for corporate bond and CDS pricing. They nd the forward-looking
option-implied volatility to dominate the historical measure in explaining credit
spreads, and the gain is particularly pronounced among rms with lower credit
ratings. Only analyzing the determinants of credit spreads, they are silent on the
risk and return of capital structure arbitrage.
As the arbitrageur feeds on large variations in credit and equity markets, these
insights suggest the implied volatility to lead to superior entry and exit decisions
and trading returns. Furthermore, the gain from a more timely credit signal is
expected to be largest for the obligors of most interest to the arbitrageur, namely
those in the speculative grade segment.
Hence, we implement the strategy on 221 North American industrial obligors
in 2002 to 2004. Case studies illustrate that while model choice certainly mat-
ters in identifying relative value opportunities, the volatility input is of primary
importance. The historical volatility may severely lag the market, sending the
arbitrageur a false signal of relatively cheap protection in the aftermath of a cri-
sis. The result is large losses for the arbitrageur as market spreads continue to
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tighten. Indeed, the implied volatility may result in the exact opposite positions,
with obvious consequences for the arbitrageur.
However, irrespective of model choice and volatility calibration, the strategy is
very risky at the level of individual obligors. Convergence may never happen and
the equity hedge may be ine¤ective. This may force the arbitrageur to liquidate
positions early and su¤er large losses.
When studying the risk and return at an aggregate level, we focus on holding
period returns and a capital structure arbitrage index of monthly excess returns.
Both models generally result in insignicant excess returns, when calibrated with
a traditional volatility from historical equity returns. However, the gain from iden-
tifying relative value opportunities from option-implied volatilities is substantial.
In a variant of the strategy based on CreditGrades, the mean holding period
return for speculative grade obligors increases from 2.64 percent to 4.61 percent
when implemented with option-implied volatilities. The similar numbers based
on Leland & Toft (1996) are 3.14 versus 5.47 percent. However, the incremental
return is much smaller for investment grade obligors.
Additionally, the corresponding excess returns are highly signicant when option-
implied volatilities are used to identify opportunities - even when small gaps are
exploited. Based on CreditGrades, the mean excess return is 0.44 percent on invest-
ment grade and 1.33 percent on speculative grade obligors, both highly signicant.
The similar numbers when Leland & Toft (1996) is used to identify relative value
opportunities are 0.27 and 2.39 percent, both highly signicant. Finally, we do
not nd the excess returns to represent compensation for exposure to systematic
market factors.
We conclude that while model choice matters for the arbitrageur, it is second to
properly measured key inputs in the calibration. Hence, if the arbitrageur relies on
the dynamics of option prices when identifying relative value opportunities across
equity and credit markets, the result is a substantial aggregate gain in trading
returns above the benchmark application of capital structure arbitrage in Duarte
et al. (2005) and Yu (2006).
This paper is based on the premise that structural models price CDSs reason-
ably well. Ericsson, Reneby &Wang (2006) nd that Leland (1994), Leland & Toft
(1996) and Fan & Sundaresan (2000) underestimate bond spreads consistent with
previous studies. However, the models perform much better in predicting CDS
spreads, particularly Leland & Toft (1996). The resulting residual CDS spreads
are found to be uncorrelated with default proxies as well as non-default proxies.
Furthermore, this paper is related to Schaefer & Strebulaev (2004), who show that
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structural models produce hedge ratios of equity to debt that cannot be rejected
in empirical tests.
Since the rationale for the strategy is to exploit a lack of integration between
various markets, capital structure arbitrage is also related to studies on the lead-lag
relationship among bond, equity and CDS markets like Hull, Predescu & White
(2004), Norden & Weber (2004), Longsta¤, Mithal & Neis (2005) and Blanco,
Brennan & Marsh (2005). While the CDS is found to lead the bond market, no
denitive lead-lag relationship exists between equity and CDS markets.
Finally, Hogan, Jarrow, Teo & Warachka (2004) study statistical arbitrages,
while Mitchell & Pulvino (2001) and Mitchell, Pulvino & Sta¤ord (2002) are im-
portant studies on merger and equity arbitrage. The remainder of this paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the trading strategy, while the data is
presented in section 3. Section 4 presents the underlying models and calibration,
and section 5 illustrates some case studies. Section 6 presents the aggregate results
of the strategy, and section 7 concludes.
2 Trading Strategy
This section describes the trading strategy underlying capital structure arbitrage.
The implementation closely follows Duarte et al. (2005) and Yu (2006), to whom
we refer for a more elaborate description. Since a time-series of predicted CDS
spreads forms the basis of the strategy, we start with a short description of how
to price a CDS.
2.1 CDS Pricing
A CDS is an insurance contract against credit events such as the default on a
corporate bond (the reference obligation) by a specic issuer (reference entity).
In case of a credit event, the seller of insurance is obligated to buy the reference
obligation from the protection buyer at par.2 For this protection, the buyer pays a
periodic premium to the protection seller until the maturity of the contract or the
credit event, whichever comes rst. There is no requirement that the protection
buyer actually owns the reference obligation, in which case the CDS is used more
2In practice, there may be cash settlement or physical settlement, as well as a possible
cheapest-to-deliver option embedded in the spread. However, we refrain from this complica-
tion. Credit events can include bankruptcy, failure to pay or restructuring.
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for speculation rather than protection. Since the accrued premium must also be
paid if a credit event occurs between two payment dates, the payments t nicely
into a continuous-time framework.
First, the present value of the premium payments from a contract initated at
time 0 with maturity date T can be calculated as
EQ

c(0; T )
Z T
0
exp

 
Z s
0
rudu

1f>sgds

, (1)
where c(0; T ) denotes the annual premium known as the CDS spread, r the risk-free
interest rate, and  the default time of the obligor. EQ denotes the expectation un-
der the risk-neutral pricing measure. Assuming independence between the default
time and the risk-free interest rate, this can be written as
c(0; T )
Z T
0
P (0; s)q0(s)ds, (2)
where P (0; s) is the price of a default-free zero-coupon bond with maturity s, and
q0(s) is the risk-neutral survival probability of the obligor, P ( > s), at t = 03.
Second, the present value of the credit protection is equal to
EQ

(1 R) exp

 
Z 
0
rudu

1f<Tg

, (3)
where R is the recovery of bond market value measured as a percentage of par
in the event of default. Maintaining the assumption of independence between the
default time and the risk-free interest rate and assuming a constant R, this can be
written as
 (1 R)
Z T
0
P (0; s)q00(s)ds, (4)
where   q00(t) =  dq0(t)=dt is the probability density function of the default time.
The CDS spread is determined such that the value of the credit default swap is
zero at initiation
0 = c(0; T )
Z T
0
P (0; s)q0(s)ds+ (1 R)
Z T
0
P (0; s)q00(s)ds, (5)
3Later, we focus on constant interest rates. This assumption, together with independence be-
tween the default time and the risk-free interest rate, allows us to concentrate on the relationship
between the equity price and the CDS spread. This is exactly the relationship exploited in the
relative value strategy.
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and hence
c(0; T ) =  (1 R)
R T
0
P (0; s)q00(s)dsR T
0
P (0; s)q0(s)ds
. (6)
The preceding is the CDS spread on a newly minted contract. To calculate
daily returns to the arbitrageur on open trades, the relevant issue is the value of
the contract as market conditions change and the contract is subsequently held.
To someone who holds a long position from time 0 to t, this is equal to
(t; T ) = (c(t; T )  c(0; T ))
Z T
t
P (t; s)qt(s)ds, (7)
where c(t; T ) is the CDS spread on a contract initiated at t with maturity date
T . The value of the open CDS position (t; T ) can be interpreted as a survival-
contingent annuity maturing at date T , which depends on the term-structure of
survival probabilities qt(s) through s at time t. The survival probability qt(s)
depends on the market value of equity St through the underlying structural model,
and we follow Yu (2006) in dening the hedge ratio t as
t = N  @(t; T )
@St
, (8)
where N is the number of shares outstanding.4 Hence, t is dened as the dollar-
amount of shares bought per dollar notional in the CDS. The choice of underlying
model-framework and calibration is discussed in section 4.
2.2 Implementation of the Strategy
Using the market value of equity, an associated volatility measure and the liability
structure of the obligor, the arbitrageur uses a structural model to gauge the
richness and cheapness of the CDS spread. Comparing the daily spread observed
in the market with the equity-implied spread from the model, the model helps
identify credits that either o¤er a discount against equities or trade at a very high
level.
If e.g. the market spread at a point in time has grown substantially larger than
the model spread, the arbitrageur sees an opportunity. It might be that the credit
4This calculation deviates slightly from the one in Yu (2006), since we formulate all models
on a total value basis and not per share. Equation (8) follows from a simple application of the
chain rule.
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market is gripped by fear and the equity market is more objective. Alternatively,
he might think that the equity market is slow to react and the CDS spread is
priced fairly. If the rst view is correct, he should sell protection and if the second
view is correct, he should sell equity. Either way, the arbitrageur is counting on
the normal relationship between the two markets to return. He therefore takes on
both short positions and prots if the spreads converge. In the opposite case with
a larger model spread, the arbitrageur buys protection and equity.
This relative value strategy is supposed to be less risky than a naked position
in either market, but is of course far from a textbook denition of arbitrage.
Two important caveats to the strategy are positions initiated based on model
misspecication or mismeasured inputs. Such potential false signals of relative
mispricing are exactly what this paper addresses.
We conduct a simulated trading exercise based on this idea across all obligors.
Letting  be the trading trigger, c0t the CDS spread observed in the market at
date t and ct short-hand notation for the equity-implied model spread, we initiate
a trade each day if one of the following conditions are satised
c0t > (1 + ) ct or ct > (1 + ) c
0
t: (9)
In the rst case, a CDS with a notional of $1 and shares worth $   t  1 are
shorted.5 In the second case, the arbitrageur buys a CDS with a notional of $1
and buys shares worth $  t  1 as a hedge.
Since Yu (2006) nds his results insensitive to daily rebalancing of the equity
position, we follow his base case and adopt a static hedging scheme. The hedge
ratio in equation (8) is therefore xed throughout the trade and based on the
model CDS spread ct when entering the position.
Knowing when to enter positions, the arbitrageur must also decide when to
liquidate. We assume that exit occurs when the spreads converge, dened as
ct = c
0
t, or by the end of a pre-specied holding period, which ever comes rst. In
principle, the obligor can also default or be acquired by another company during
the holding period. Yu (2006) notes that in most cases the CDS market will
reect these events long before the actual occurrences, and the arbitrageur will
have ample time to make exit decisions.6 Specically, it is reasonable to assume
5t is, of course, negative.
6This argument seems to be supported in Arora, Bohn & Zhu (2005), who study the surprise
e¤ect of distress announcements. Conditional on market information, they nd only 11 percent
of the distressed rmsequities and 18 percent of the distressed bonds to respond signicantly.
The vast majority of prices are found to reect the credit deterioration well before the distress
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that the arbitrageur will be forced to close his positions once the liquidity dries
up in the underlying obligor. Such incidents are bound to impose losses on the
arbitrageur.
2.3 Trading returns
The calculation of trading returns is fundamental to analyze how the risk and
return di¤er across model assumptions and calibration methods. Since the CDS
position has a zero market value at initiation, trading returns must be calculated by
assuming that the arbitrageur has a certain level of initial capital. This assumption
allows us to hold xed the e¤ects of leverage on the analysis. The initial capital
is used to nance the equity hedge, and is credited or deducted as a result of
intermediate payments such as dividends or CDS premia. Each trade is equipped
with this initial capital and a limited liability assumption to ensure well-dened
returns. Hence, each trade can be thought of as an individual hedge fund subject
to a forced liquidation when the total value of the portfolio becomes zero.7
Through the holding period the value of the equity position is straightforward,
but the value of the CDS position has to be calculated using equation (7) and
market CDS spreads c0(t; T ) and c0(0; T ). Since secondary market trading is very
limited in the CDS market and not covered by our dataset, we adopt the same
simplifying assumption as Yu (2006), and approximate c0 (t; T ) with c0 (t; t+ T ).
That is, we approximate a CDS contract maturing in four years and ten months,
say, with a freshly issued 5-year spread. This should not pose a problem since the
di¤erence between to points on the curve is likely to be much smaller than the
time-variation in spreads.
Yu (2006) nds his results insensitive to the exact size of transaction costs for
trading CDSs. We adopt his base case, and assume a 5 percent proportional bid-
ask spread on the CDS spread. The CDS market is likely to be the largest single
source of transaction costs for the arbitrageur. We therefore ignore transaction
costs on equities, which is reasonable under the static hedging scheme.
announcement.
7This is reminiscent of potential large losses when marked to market, triggering margin calls
and forcing an early liquidation of positions.
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3 Data
Data on CDS spreads is provided by the ValuSpread database from Lombard Risk
Systems, dating back to July 1999. This data is also used by Lando & Mortensen
(2005) and Berndt, Jarrow & Kang (2006). The data consists of mid-market CDS
quotes on both sovereigns and corporates, with varying maturity, restructuring
clause, seniority and currency. For a given date, reference entity and contract
specication, the database reports a composite CDS quote together with an intra-
daily standard deviation of collected quotes. The composite quote is calculated
as a mid-market quote by obtaining quotes from up to 25 leading market makers.
This o¤ers a more reliable measure of the market spread than using a single source,
and the standard deviation measures how representative the mid-market quote is
for the overall market.
We conne ourselves to 5-year composite CDS quotes on senior unsecured debt
for North American corporate obligors with currencies denominated in US dollars.
Indeed, the 5-year maturity is considered the most liquid point on the credit curve.
Regarding the specication of the credit event, we follow Yu (2006) and large
parts of the literature in using contracts with a modied restructuring clause. The
frequency of data on CDS quotes increases signicantly through time, reecting
the growth and improved liquidity in the market. To generate a subsample of the
data suitable for capital structure arbitrage, we apply several lters.
First, we merge the CDS data with quarterly balance sheet data from Compu-
stat and daily stock market data from CRSP. The quarterly balance sheet data is
lagged one month from the end of the quarter to avoid the look-ahead bias in using
data not yet available in the market. We then exclude rms from the nancial and
utility sector.
Second, for each obligor in the sample, daily data on the 30-day at-the-money
put-implied volatility is obtained from OptionMetrics. OptionMetrics is a com-
prehensive database of daily information on exchange-listed equity options in the
U.S. since 1996. OptionMetrics generates the 30-day at-the-money put-implied
volatility by interpolation.
Third, in order to conduct the simulated trading exercise, a reasonably continu-
ous time-series of CDS quotes must be available. In addition, the composite quote
must have a certain quality. Therefore, we dene the relative quote dispersion as
the intra-daily standard deviation of collected quotes divided by the mid-market
quote. All daily mid-market quotes with an intra-daily quote dispersion of zero
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or above 40 percent are then deleted.8 For each obligor, we next search for the
longest string of more than 100 daily quotes no more than 14 calender days apart,
which have all information available on balance sheet variables, equity market and
equity options data.9 As noted in Yu (2006), this should also yield the most liquid
part of coverage for the obligor, forcing the arbitrageur to close his positions once
the liquidity vanishes.
Finally, 5-year and 3-month constant maturity treasury yields are obtained
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. These interest rates are used to
calculate the equity-implied 5-year CDS spread, and to calculate excess returns
from the trading strategy.
Applying this ltration to the merged dataset results in 221 obligors with 65,476
daily composite quotes, dating back to July 2002 and onwards to the end of Sep-
tember 2004. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the obligors across the senior
unsecured credit rating from Standard & Poors when entering the sample. The
variables presented are averages over time and then rms. The majority of rms
are BBB rated, and 16 rms are in the speculative grade segment, including one
non-rated obligor. A lower spread is associated with a lower leverage and volatility,
which is in line with predictions of structural credit risk models.
We implement the trading strategy using the implied volatility from equity
options (IV), and a 250-day volatility from a historical time-series of equity values
(HV). On average these volatilities are similar, but it turns out that the dynamics
of option prices provide the arbitrageur with superior information. The average
correlation between changes in the spread and the equity value is negative as
expected from a structural viewpoint, but fairly low. This is consistent with Yu
(2006) and correlations ranging fromminus 5 to minus 15 percent quoted by traders
in Currie & Morris (2002). This indicates that the two markets may drift apart
and hold divergent views on obligors, which fuels the arbitrageur ex ante. Ex post,
it suggests that the equity hedge may be ine¤ective.
[Table1 about here]
8One could argue for a cut-o¤ point at a lower relative dispersion, but on the other hand a
trader is likely to take advantage of high uncertainty in the market. The vast majority of quotes
have a relative dispersion below 20 percent.
9As discussed below, this may give rise to a survivorship issue. However, we try to minimize
this by requiring a string of only 100 spreads, far less than Yu (2006). In any case, this should
not pose a problem, since the focus of the paper is on relative risk and return across models and
calibration methods, and not absolute measures.
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4 Model Choice and Volatility Calibration
Having the trading strategy and data explained, we next introduce the two underly-
ing models and the associated calibration. The formulas for each model including
the risk-neutral survival probability qt(s), the CDS spread c(0; T ), the contract
value (t; T ) and the equity delta (t; T ) are described in the appendix. Further
details on the models can be found in Finger (2002) and Leland & Toft (1996).
4.1 CreditGrades
The CreditGrades model is jointly developed by RiskMetrics, JP Morgan, Gold-
man Sachs and Deutsche Bank with the purpose to establish a simple framework
linking credit and equity markets. As noted by Currie & Morris (2002) and Yu
(2006), this model has become an industry benchmark widely used by traders,
preferably calibrated with a rolling 1000-day historical volatility as advocated in
Finger (2002).
It loosely builds on Black & Cox (1976), with default dened as the rst pas-
sage time of rm assets to an unobserved default barrier. Hence, deviating from
traditional structural models, it assumes that the default barrier is an unknown
constant drawn from a known distribution. This element of uncertain recovery
increases short-term spreads, but cannot do so consistently through time.10
Originally, the model is built on a per-share basis taking into account preferred
shares and the di¤erences between short-term versus long-term and nancial versus
non-nancial obligations, when calculating debt per share. Like Yu (2006), we
only work with total liabilities and common shares outstanding. Therefore, we
formulate the model based on total liabilities and market value of equity.
Under the risk-neutral measure, the rm assets V are assumed to follow
dVt = V VtdWt, (10)
where V is the asset volatility and Wt is a standard Brownian motion. The
zero drift is consistent with the observation of stationary leverage ratios in Collin-
Dufresne & Goldstein (2001). The default barrier is LD, where L is a random
recovery rate given default, and D denotes total liabilities. The recovery rate
L follows a lognormal distribution with mean L, interpreted as the mean global
recovery rate on all liabilities, and standard deviation . Then, R in equation (6)
10A theoretically more appealing approach is given by Du¢ e & Lando (2001).
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is the recovery rate on the specic debt issue underlying the CDS.
Instead of working with a full formula for the value of equity S; CreditGrades
uses the linear approximation
V = S + LD, (11)
which also gives a relation between asset volatility V and equity volatility S
V = S
S
S + LD
: (12)
The model is easy to implement in practice. In particular, D is the total liabil-
ities from quarterly balance sheet data, S is the market value of equity calculated
as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the closing price, and r is the
5-year constant maturity treasury yield. Furthermore, the bond-specic recovery
rate R is assumed to be 0:5 and the standard deviation of the global recovery rate
 is 0:3. All parameters are motivated in Finger (2002) and Yu (2006).
The volatility measure is a key input to the pricing of credit. Instead of using
a rolling 1000-day volatility S from historical equity values as Yu (2006), we im-
plement the strategy using a 250-day historical volatility and the implied volatility
from equity options. According to Cremers et al. (2006) and Cao et al. (2006),
the implied volatility contains important and timely information about credit risk
di¤erent from the historical measure. This may potentially lead the arbitrageur
to superior entry and exit decisions and trading returns. We expect the gain to be
most pronounced for the speculative grade sample, where obligors typically expe-
rience large variations in spreads. Here, historical volatilities may lag true market
levels and send a false signal of mispricing to the arbitrageur.
Finally, we follow Yu (2006) in using the mean global recovery rate L to align
the model with the credit market before conducting the trading exercise. In par-
ticular, we infer L by minimizing the sum of squared pricing errors using the rst
10 CDS spreads in the sample for each rm. Now, all parameters are in place
to calculate the time-series of CDS spreads underlying the analysis, together with
hedge ratios and values of open CDS positions.
4.2 Leland & Toft (1996)
This model assumes that the decision to default is made by a manager, who acts
to maximize the value of equity. At each moment, the manager must address
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the question whether meeting promised debt service payments is optimal for the
equityholders, thereby keeping their call option alive. If the asset value exceeds
the endogenously derived default barrier VB, the rm will optimally continue to
service the debt - even if the asset value is below the principal value or if cash
ow available for payout is insu¢ cient to nance the net debt service, requiring
additional equity contributions.
In particular, rm assets V are assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion
under the risk-neutral measure
dVt = (r   )Vtdt+ V VtdWt, (13)
where r is the constant risk-free interest rate,  is the fraction of asset value paid
out to security holders, V is the asset volatility and Wt is a standard Brownian
motion. Debt of constant maturity  is continuously rolled over, implying that at
any time s the total outstanding debt principal P will have a uniform distribution
over maturities in the interval (s; s+). Each debt contract in the multi-layered
structure is serviced by a continuous coupon. The resulting total coupon payments
C are tax deductible at a rate  , and the realized costs of nancial distress amount
to a fraction  of the value of assets in default VB. Rolling over nite maturity
debt in the way prescribed implies a stationary capital structure, where the total
outstanding principal P , total coupon C, average maturity 
2
and default barrier
VB remain constant through time.
To determine the total value of the levered rm v(Vt), the model follows Leland
(1994) in valuing bankruptcy costs BC(Vt) and tax benets resulting from debt
issuance TB(Vt) as time-independent securities. It follows, that
(Vt) = Vt + TB(Vt) BC(Vt) (14)
= S(Vt) +D(Vt),
where S(Vt) is the market value of equity and D(Vt) the market value of total debt.
To implement the model, we follow Ericsson et al. (2006) in setting the real-
ized bankruptcy cost fraction  = 0:15, the tax rate  = 0:20 and the average
debt maturity 
2
= 3:38.11 Furthermore, as above, P is the total liabilities from
11The choice of 15 percent bankruptcy costs lies well within the range estimated by Andrade
& Kaplan (1998). 20 percent as an e¤ective tax rate is below the corporate tax rate to reect
the personal tax rate advantage of equity returns. Stohs & Mauer (1996) nd an average debt
maturity of 3.38 years using a panel of 328 industrial rms with detailed debt information in
Moodys Industrial Manuals in 1980-1989.
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quarterly balance sheet data, S is the market value of equity and r is the 5-year
constant maturity treasury yield. We also follow Ericsson et al. (2006) in assuming
that the average coupon paid out to all debtholders equals the risk-free interest
rate, C = rP .12 The asset payout rate  is calculated as a time-series mean of
the weighted average historical dividend yield and relative interest expense from
balance sheet data
 =

Interest expenses
Total liabilities

 L + (Dividend yield) (1  L) (15)
L =
Total liabilities
Total liabilities+Market equity
.
Contrary to CreditGrades, the default barrier VB is endogenously determined
and varies with fundamental characteristics of the rm such as leverage, asset
volatility, debt maturity and asset payout rates. Due to the full-blown relationship
between equity and assets, the estimation of the asset value V and asset volatility
V is a more troublesome exercise in Leland & Toft (1996).
Hence, when analyzing the trading strategy with a 250-day historical volatil-
ity, we use the iterative algorithm of Moodys KMV outlined in Crosbie & Bohn
(2003) and Vassalou & Xing (2004) to infer the unobserved time-series of asset
values and asset volatility. This iterative algorithm is preferable over an instanta-
neous relationship between asset volatility V and equity volatility S, governed
by Itos lemma. The latter underlies the implementation of CreditGrades in equa-
tion (12), and is used in Jones, Mason & Rosenfeld (1984). As noted in Lando
(2004), the iterative algorithm is particularly preferable when changes in leverage
are signicant over the estimation period.
In short, the iterative scheme goes as follows. The market value of equity St
is a function of a parameter vector , the asset value Vt, default barrier VB(V )
and asset volatility V , St = f(Vt; V ; ). Using quarterly balance sheet data, a
rolling 250-day window of historical equity values and an initial guess of the asset
volatility, we calculate the default barrier and invert the equity pricing formula to
infer an implied time-series of asset values Vt (V ) = f 1(St; V ; ). The market
value of assets follow a geometric Brownian motion, allowing us to obtain an
updated asset volatility and default barrier. This procedure is repeated until the
values of V converge.
12A rms debt consists of more than market bonds, and usually a substantial fraction of total
debt is non-interest bearing such as accrued taxes and supplier credits. Furthermore, corporate
bonds may be issued below par, which also opens up for this approximation.
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When analyzing the trading exercise based on implied volatilities from equity
options, we do not face the problem of changing leverage in a historical estimation
window. Therefore, we solve the instantaneous relationship
St = f(Vt; V ; ) (16)
S =
@St
@Vt
V
Vt
St
(17)
numerically for the unknown asset value Vt and asset volatility V .
Before conducting the trading exercise, we now use the bond-specic recovery
rate R to align the model with the market spreads. This is done since the default
barrier is endogenously determined. For this purpose, we again use the rst 10
CDS spreads in the sample for each rm. As noted in Yu (2006), the bond-specic
recovery rate is also the free parameter used in practice by traders to t the level
of market spreads.
4.3 Model Calibration and Implied Parameters
Table 2 presents summary statistics of implied parameters from CreditGrades and
Leland & Toft (1996), using a rolling 250-day historical volatility (HV) and implied
volatility (IV). The table also shows average calibration targets from the equity
and equity options market, together with asset payout rates. In CreditGrades
implemented with a historical volatility in panel A, the average market value of
assets V is $20,592 million with a median of $14,839 million, while the average and
median expected default barrier LD is $8,556 million and $3,846 million, respec-
tively. The mean asset volatility V is 22.8 percent, with a median of 21.3 percent.
Finally, the average and median mean global recovery rate L is 0.799 and 0.573,
respectively. Similar implied parameters result on aggregate when implemented
with the implied volatility in panel B.
[Table 2 about here]
When implementing Leland & Toft (1996) in panel C and D, several di¤erences
from CreditGrades are apparent. First, the asset values appear larger and asset
volatilities lower. This is due to the observation that the relatively high endogenous
default barrier VB increases the theoretical equity volatility, ceteris paribus. Hence,
the model implies a higher asset value and/or lower asset volatility in order to
match the theoretical and observed equity volatility.
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Second, the variation in implied bond recovery R across the two volatility mea-
sures is large. Based on the historical volatility, both the average and median im-
plied bond recovery are highly negative, indicating that the model underestimates
the level of market spreads in the beginning of the sample period.13 Implied recov-
eries are more plausible when inferred from option-implied volatilities. Although
the mean continues to be negative, the median is 0.233. This is indicative of an
implied volatility that varies stronger with changes in the CDS spread. Indeed,
calculating the mean correlation between changes in CDS spreads and changes in
volatility measures, the correlation is 1.8 and 9.9 percent based on historical and
implied volatilities, respectively.
The variation in implied mean global recovery L in CreditGrades is much
smaller across volatility measures. This is a manifestation of the di¤erence in
information used at various stages, when calibrating the two models. In Cred-
itGrades the expected default barrier is exogenous, while it is endogenously de-
termined in Leland & Toft (1996). As a result of the linear approximation in
equation (11), asset values, the asset volatility and the expected default barrier
are not nailed down and determined in CreditGrades until the mean global recov-
ery rate is inferred from the initial CDS spreads. Subsequent to nailing down this
key parameter, there is a one-to-one relationship between changes in equity and
assets, @S
@V
= 1.
The default mechanism in Leland & Toft (1996) implies a di¤erent use of mar-
ket data. Here, the asset value and asset volatility are solely determined from
the equity and equity options market. Together with the endogenous default bar-
rier, this gives far less exibility when tting the nal bond recovery from initial
CDS spreads. The result is more extreme values for this parameter.14 However,
the subsequent relationship and wedge between equity and assets vary with the
distance to default. When close to default, @S
@V
is very steep and below one. Al-
though delta may go above one as the credit quality improves, the relationship
approaches one-to-one when far from default. Hence, the variation in asset dy-
namics across the two models may be substantial for speculative grade obligors,
with direct consequences for the arbitrageur.
13This should not be a problem for the current trading strategy, since subsequent movements
in relative prices across equity and credit markets drive the arbitrageur, not absolute levels.
The most extreme bond recovery of -1,858 results from an underestimation of only 50 bps. In
this case, the market spread is close to 50 bps, while the model spread with a reasonable bond
recovery is close to zero.
14If CreditGrades is implemented with a mean global recovery of 0.5 as suggested in Finger
(2002), we qualitatively get the same results for the implied bond recovery as in Leland & Toft
(1996).
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From the discussion in section 2, the chosen structural model plays a central
role in all parts of capital structure arbitrage. In particular, the model underlies
the term-structure of survival probabilities, equity-implied CDS spreads, hedge
ratios, the valuation of open CDS positions and trading returns. As shown above,
assumptions behind CreditGrades and Leland & Toft (1996), as well as practical
implementation, vary substantially. How these di¤erences in model choice and
calibration manifest in protability and strategy execution is analyzed next. Before
turning to the general results across all obligors, some case studies are analyzed.
5 Case Studies
In this section, the two models calibrated with historical and option-implied volatil-
ities are used to identify divergent views in equity and credit markets. The case
studies illustrate that while model choice certainly matters in identifying relative
value opportunities, the volatility input is of primary importance. In fact, the two
volatility measures may result in opposite positions, with obvious consequences for
the arbitrageur. The nal study illustrates that the strategy is very risky at the
level of individual obligors.
5.1 Sears, Roebuck and Company
Figure 1 illustrates the fundamentals of capital structure arbitrage for the large
retailer Sears, Roebuck and Company, rated A by S&P and Baa1 by Moodys.
Panel A and B depict the equity-implied model spreads and CDS spreads observed
in the market from September 2002 to June 2004 (excluding the initial 10 spreads
reserved for calibration), while panel C and D depict equity volatilities and the
market value of equity, respectively.
The uncertainty in the markets increases substantially in the beginning of the
period. Moodys changes their rating outlook to negative on October 18 2002, due
to increasing uncertainty in the credit card business and management changes. In
this period, equity prices tumble and CDS spreads reach 379 bps on October 24
2002, a doubling in 2 weeks. While the markets begin to recover shortly thereafter,
model spreads based on the sticky historical volatility continue far into 2003 to
suggest the arbitrageur to buy protection and buy equity as a hedge. However,
with only few exceptions the market spreads tighten in the succeeding period,
and the market and model spreads never converge. Depending on the size of the
trading trigger and the chosen model, many losing CDS positions are initiated
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although partially o¤set by an increasing equity price.
Panel C illustrates how the historical volatility severely lags the more timely
implied volatility, sending the arbitrageur a false signal of relatively cheap protec-
tion in the aftermath of the crisis. In fact, spreads inferred from implied volatilities
quickly tighten and may initiate the exact opposite strategy. Using this volatility,
spreads in Leland & Toft (1996) indicate that protection is trading too expensive
relative to equity from the end of 2002. Indeed, selling protection and selling eq-
uity as hedge result in trading returns of 5 to 15 percent on each daily position
due to tightening market spreads and convergence on June 5, 2003. Subsequent
to convergence, implied volatilities suggest the equity and credit markets to move
in tandem and hold similar views on the credit outlooks.
As a nal observation, model spreads in CreditGrades react stronger to changes
in volatility than Leland & Toft (1996), widening to over 1000 bps as the implied
volatility from equity options peaks. This may be due to the endogenous default
barrier in the latter model. Indeed, increasing the asset volatility causes equity-
holders to optimally default later in Leland & Toft (1996). This mitigates the
e¤ect on the spread.
[Figure 1 about here]
5.2 Time Warner and Motorola
Simulating the trading strategy on TimeWarner and Motorola supports the former
insights. Figure 2 depicts the fundamentals behind Time Warner, rated BBB
by S&P and Baa1 by Moodys. In August 2002 just prior to the beginning of
the sample, Moodys changes their outlook to negative as the SEC investigates
the accounting practices and internal controls. As markets recover in late 2002,
CreditGrades with historical volatility indicates that protection is cheap relative to
equity, while spreads in Leland & Toft (1996) are more neutral. Although equity
prices increase throughout 2003, many losing trades are initiated as market spreads
are more than cut by half within few months and Moodys changes their outlook
back to stable.
Again, the historical volatility lags the market following the episode, while the
implied volatility is more responsive. In October and November 2002, where mar-
ket spreads have already tightened substantially, model spreads inferred from im-
plied volatilities suggest that protection is expensive relative to equity and should
tighten further. Selling protection at 339 bps and equity at $14.75 on October
31, 2002, result in convergence and 15 percent returns on December 12, where the
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CDS and equity are trading at 259 bps and $13.56, respectively. However, spreads
inferred from implied volatilities are volatile, resulting in rather noisy estimates of
credit outlooks and a frequent liquidation of positions as market spreads tighten.
Operating with a very low trigger may reverse positions several times during this
period, while a trigger of 0.5 results in only few positions.
In gure 3, the key variables for Motorola, rated BBB by S&P, are depicted.
Building on historical volatilities, the arbitrageur initiates many trades and suf-
fers losses, while implied volatilities suggest the two markets to move in tandem
and hold similar views on the obligor. In the latter case, only few relative value
opportunities are apparent.
[Figure 2 and 3 about here]
5.3 Mandalay Resort Group
Capital structure arbitrage is very risky when based on individual obligors, and
the arbitrageur may end up in severe problems irrespective of model choice and
calibration. Figure 4 presents the fundamental variables behind Mandalay Resort
Group, rated BB by S&P. Throughout the coverage, spreads in Leland & Toft
(1996) based on historical volatilities diverge from market spreads in a smooth
manner, while spreads in CreditGrades diverge more slowly. In both cases, the
arbitrageur sells protection and equity as hedge but su¤ers losses as positions are
liquidated after the maximum holding period.
Based on implied volatilities, May and June 2004 are particularly painful as
model spreads plunge and stay tight throughout the coverage. On June 4, 2004
the competitor MGM Mirage announces a bid to acquire Mandalay Resort Group
for $68 per share plus assumption of Mandalays existing debt. Moodys places
the rating on review for a possible downgrade, due to a high level of uncertainty
regarding the level of debt employed to nance the takeover. As a result, the
equity price increases from $54 to $69 over a short period, the implied volatility
plunges and the CDS spread widens from 188 bps to 227 bps.15 On June 15, 2004
a revised o¤er of $71 per share is approved, and the transaction is completed on
April 26, 2005.
This opposite reaction in equity and credit gives the arbitrageur short in both
markets a painful one-two punch similar to the one experienced by hedge funds
15Implied volatilities from at-the-money calls plunge as well.
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in May 2005, where General Motors is downgraded while the equity price soars.16
Luckily, not many trades are open during the takeover bid as model and market
spreads recently converged. However, the short positions initiated in May 2004,
where credit seems expensive relative to equity, su¤er large losses on both legs.
[Figure 4 about here]
6 General Results
In this section, we simulate the trading strategy for all 221 obligors. Following
Yu (2006), we assume an initial capital of $0.5 for each trade and $1 notional in
the CDS. The strategy is implemented for trading triggers  of 0.5 and 2, and
maximum holding periods of 30 and 180 days.
Naturally, absolute trading returns will vary with the above characteristics, as
well as the particular period studied and how to account for vanishing liquidity
etc. However, these characteristics are all xed when studying the relative risk
and return across models and calibration methods. Therefore, a scaling of returns
with the amount of initial capital is unlikely to inuence our conclusions.17 Indeed,
although based on a di¤erent dataset, the benchmark results for CreditGrades with
a historical volatility are similar to the ndings in Yu (2006).
Table 3 and 4 present the summary statistics of holding period returns based on
CreditGrades and Leland & Toft (1996), respectively. A longer maximum hold-
ing period leads to more converging trades, fewer trades with negative returns
and higher average returns. This fundamental result underlies both models and
volatility measures. Consistent with Yu (2006), although the distribution of re-
turns becomes less dispersed, a higher trading trigger does not necessarily lead to
higher mean returns.
When identifying relative value opportunities from implied not historical volatil-
ities, the number of initiated trades rises for investment grade obligors and falls
for speculative grade obligors. This results from both models, although the ab-
solute number of trades is larger in Leland & Toft (1996). This is consistent with
ndings in Finger & Stamicar (2005a) and Cao et al. (2006), where the advantage
of implied volatility in tracking market spreads with CreditGrades is concentrated
16This case study is discussed in Duarte et al. (2005).
17Yu (2006) also conducts his analysis with an initial capital of $0.1. The resulting returns
are scaled up accordingly. Unreported results with this initial capital and other trading triggers
leave our conclusions unchanged.
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among speculative grade obligors. We nd this measure to identify fewer relative
value opportunities on obligors with larger variations in spreads.
The results clearly show a di¤erence in risk and return across models and
volatility input. Identifying relative value opportunities on speculative grade oblig-
ors in CreditGrades with a historical volatility, a maximum holding period of 180
days and a trading trigger of 2 yields a mean holding period return of 2.64 percent.
However, simulating the trading strategy with option-implied volatilities increases
the return to 4.61 percent.18 The corresponding numbers based on Leland & Toft
(1996) are 3.14 and 5.47 percent. The gain from implied volatilities across trading
triggers and maximum holding periods is also apparent from the number of trades
ending in convergence and the fraction of trades with negative returns. However,
the incremental return is much smaller for investment grade obligors.
On top of this, the mean holding period return and dispersion are both higher
on speculative grade obligors compared to the investment grade sample. This
supports the similar result in Yu (2006) and happens irrespective of model choice
and volatility measure. Although more likely to su¤er from vanishing liquidity and
default, this supports his observation that the aggregate success of the strategy
depends on the availability of large variations in spreads. For such obligors, the
more timely implied volatility results in incremental trading returns from superior
entry and exit decisions.
The holding period returns are more favorable when Leland & Toft (1996) is
used to identify relative value opportunities. However, in practice it is hard to
discern exactly where the di¤erence arises, as the models di¤er in many respects
and enter in all parts of the strategy. While model choice does matter, it seems
second to properly measured key inputs.
[Table 3 and 4 about here]
6.1 Capital Structure Arbitrage Index Returns
As illustrated in the previous sections, capital structure arbitrage is very risky at
the level of individual trades. The hedge may be ine¤ective and the markets may
continue to diverge, resulting in losses and potential early liquidations. However,
when initiated on the cross-section of obligors, the strategy may be protable
18While the average protability increases when identifying relative value opportunities from
implied volatilities, so does the volatility of returns. As the mean holding period return consists
of many overlapping holding periods, the statistical signicance of trading returns is analyzed
from a return index below.
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on average depending on the particular implementation. Having established this
nding, the next step is to understand the sources of the prots, i.e. whether the
returns are correlated with priced systematic risk factors. Hence, we construct a
monthly capital structure arbitrage excess return index from all individual trades,
following Duarte et al. (2005) and Yu (2006).
Specically, we compute daily excess returns for all individual trades over the
entire holding period. On a given day, thousands of trades may be open. By
essentially assuming that the arbitrageur is always invested in an equally-weighted
portfolio of hedge funds, where each fund consists of one trade, we calculate an
equally-weighted average of the excess returns on a daily basis. These average
daily excess returns are then compounded into a monthly frequency.
Table 5 presents the summary statistics of monthly excess returns based on a
maximum holding period of 180 days, covering 24 months in 2002-2004. However,
some strategies result in months with no trades. In this case, a zero excess return
is assumed.
Again, although also present in the investment grade segment, the benet
of option-implied volatilities is concentrated among speculative grade obligors.
Additionally, timely inputs are relatively more important than the exact structural
model underlying the strategy. In particular, when based on CreditGrades with
option-implied volatilities and a trading trigger of 2, the mean excess return is
0.44 percent on investment grade and 1.33 percent on speculative grade obligors.
These numbers are highly signicant after correcting for serial correlation. The
corresponding numbers when Leland & Toft (1996) is used to identify relative value
opportunities are 0.27 and 2.39 percent, respectively, both highly signicant.
The excess returns resulting from a historical volatility are much smaller and
most often insignicant. Indeed, the mean excess return from this measure may
turn negative and signicant at a lower trading trigger of 0.5, while it continues
to be positive and signicant based on implied volatilities.
Addressing whether xed income arbitrage is comparable to picking up nickels
in front of a steamroller, Duarte et al. (2005) nd that most of the strategies
result in monthly excess returns that are positively skewed. While our results
are mixed when relative value positions are identied from historical volatilities,
the skewness is always positive when based on the implied measure. Thus, while
producing large negative returns from time to time, this strategy tends to generate
even larger o¤setting positive returns.
[Table 5 about here]
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As a nal exercise, we explore whether the excess returns represent compensa-
tion for exposure to systematic market factors.19 In particular, we use the excess
return on the S&P Industrial Index (S&PINDS) to proxy for equity market risk.
To proxy for investment grade and speculative grade bond market risk, the ex-
cess returns on the Lehman Brothers Baa and Ba Intermediate Index (LHIBAAI)
and (LHHYBBI), respectively, are used. These variables are obtained from Datas-
tream. As argued by Duarte et al. (2005), such market factors are also likely to
be sensitive to major nancial events such as a sudden ight-to-quality or ight-
to-liquidity. As this risk would be compensated in the excess returns from these
portfolios, we may be able to control for the component of returns that is com-
pensation for bearing the risk of major, but not yet realized, nancial events.
As the CDS market was rather illiquid before mid-2002, the regressions consist
of no more than 24 monthly excess returns. Hence, the results must be interpreted
with caution. Yu (2006) nds no relationship between capital structure arbitrage
monthly excess returns and any of the factors, and the factors cannot bid away the
alphas (regression intercepts) of the strategy. Our R2 range from 8 to 35 percent,
but the market factors are either insignicant or only weakly signicant. Surpris-
ingly, the occasional weak signicance is not related to the size and signicance
of excess returns, nor rating category. Hence, the evidence does not indicate that
the excess returns represent compensation for exposure to factors proxying equity
and bond market risk.
As we only have 24 monthly excess returns, there is little chance of detecting
signicant alphas after controlling for the market risk. However, the structure
of excess returns after a risk-adjustment is similar to the structure of raw excess
returns in table 5. Indeed, the largest di¤erence in alphas across the historical
and option-implied volatility is in the speculative grade segment. While three of
four intercepts are negative based on the investment grade obligors, it is always
positive on speculative grade obligors.
[Table 6 about here]
7 Conclusion
This paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of the risk and return of capital
structure arbitrage using alternative structural credit risk models and volatility
19For brevity, only regressions with a trading trigger of 2 are reported. Similar results are
obtained at a lower threshold of 0.5.
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measures. Studying 221 North American industrial obligors in 2002 to 2004, a di-
vergence between equity and credit markets initiates a convergence-based market-
neutral trading strategy. However, an observed di¤erence in market and equity-
implied model CDS spread may be driven by model misspecication and key inputs
may be mismeasured, sending a false signal of mispricing in the market. These
caveats constitute the focal point in the study.
As the arbitrageur feeds on large variations in equity and credit markets and
the asset volatility is a key input to the pricing of credit, a timely volatility measure
is desirable. In such markets, the historical volatility may severely lag the market,
suggesting the arbitrageur to enter into unfortunate positions and face large losses.
Using an option-implied volatility results in superior strategy execution and
may initiate the opposite positions of the historical measure. The result is more
positions ending in convergence, more positions with positive holding-period re-
turns and highly signicant excess returns. The gain in returns is largest for the
speculative grade obligors, and cannot be explained by well-known equity and bond
market factors. At a low threshold for strategy initiation, the excess return may
turn negative and signicant based on the historical measure, while it continues
to be positive and signicant based on implied volatilities.
Duarte et al. (2005) and Yu (2006) conduct the rst analysis of the strategy by
implementing the industry benchmark CreditGrades with a historical volatility, as
reputed used by most professionals. CreditGrades and the Leland & Toft (1996)
model di¤er extensively in assumptions governing default and calibration method.
However, while model choice certainly matters, the exact model underlying the
strategy is of secondary importance.
While protable on an aggregate level, individual trades can be very risky.
Irrespective of model choice and volatility measure, the market and equity-implied
model spread may continue to drift apart, and the equity hedge may be ine¤ective.
This may force the arbitrageur to liquidate individual positions early, and su¤er
large losses.
A structural model allows for numerous implementations of capital structure
arbitrage, as it links rm fundamentals with equities, equity options, corporate
bonds and credit derivatives. As we often nd the hedge in cash equities ine¤ective,
a further improvement may lie in o¤setting positions in equity options such as out-
of-the-money puts. This non-linear product may also reduce the gamma risk of the
strategy, which can cause losses in a fast moving market. As CDS data continues
to expand, future research will shed light on many unexplored properties of relative
value trading across equity and credit markets.
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A Appendix
The appendix contains formulas for the risk-neutral survival probability qt(s), the
CDS spread c(0; T ), the contract value (t; T ) and the equity delta t. Both
models assume constant default-free interest rates, which allow us to concentrate
on the relationship between the equity price and CDS spread, also exploited in the
relative value strategy.
A.1 CreditGrades
The default barrier is given by
LD = LDeZ 
2=2, (18)
where L is the random recovery rate given default, L = E (L), Z is a standard
normal random variable and 2 = V ar (lnL). Finger (2002) provides an approx-
imate solution to the survival probability using a time-shifted Brownian motion,
which yields the following result20
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A.1.1 The CDS Spread and Hedge Ratio
Assuming constant interest rates, the CDS spread for maturity T is found by
inserting the survival probability (19) in equation (6), yielding
c(0; T ) = r(1 R) 1  q (0) +H(T )
q (0)  q (T ) e rT  H (T ) , (22)
20In essence, the uncertainty in the default barrier is shifted to the starting value of the
Brownian motion. In particular, the approximation assumes that Wt starts at an earlier time
than t = 0: As a result, the default probability is non-zero for even very small t, including t = 0.
In other models such as Leland & Toft (1996), the survival probability q (0) = 1.
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where
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and G(T ) is given in Reiner & Rubinstein (1991).
When determining the hedge ratio, we follow Yu (2006) and approximate the
contract value in equation (7) by
(0; T ) = (c (0; T )  c)
Z T
0
e rsq (s) ds (27)
=
c (0; T )  c
r
 
q (0)  q (T ) e rT  H (T ) ,
where c (0; T ) is a function of the value of equity S in equation (22), and c is the
CDS spread at initiation.21
Using equation (8) and the product rule, the hedge ratio is found as
0 = N  d (0; T )
dS
=
N
r
@c (0; T )
@S
 
q (0)  q (T ) e rT  H (T ) , (28)
where N denotes the number of shares outstanding. The second term in the
product rule is zero, since by denition c is numerically equal to c (0; T ), evaluated
at the equity value S. Finally, @c(0;T )
@S
is found numerically.
A.2 Leland & Toft (1996)
Equation (14) may be written as
(Vt) = Vt + 
C
r
 
1 

Vt
VB
 x!
  VB

Vt
VB
 x
, (29)
21Yu (2006) interprets this equation in his appendix. Equation (27) represents the value of a
contract entered into one instant ago at spread c, that now has a quoted spread of c (0; T ) due
to a change in the value of equity.
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with the value of debt D(Vt)
D(Vt) =
C
r
+

P   C
r

1  er
r
  I ()

+

(1  )VB   C
r

J () , (30)
and equity S(Vt)
S(Vt) = Vt + 
C
r
 
1 

Vt
VB
 x!
  VB

Vt
VB
 x
  C
r
 

P   C
r

1  er
r
  I ()

(31)
 

(1  )VB   C
r

J () ,
and default barrier VB
VB =
C
r
 
A
r
 B  AP
r
  Cx
r
1 + x  (1  )B . (32)
The components of the above formulae are
A = 2ae r

aV
p


  2z

zV
p


(33)
  2
V
p



zV
p


+
2e r
V
p



aV
p


+ (z   a) ,
B =  

2z +
2
z2V



zV
p


(34)
  2
V
p



zV
p


+ (z   a) + 1
z2V
,
I () =
1
r
 
K ()  e rF () , (35)
K () =

V
VB
 a+z
 (j1 ()) +

V
VB
 a z
 (j2 ()) , (36)
F () =  (h1 ()) +

V
VB
 2a
 (h2 ()) , (37)
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J () =
1
zV
p

 
 

V
VB
 a+z
 (j1 ()) j1 ()
+

V
VB
 a z
 (j2 ()) j2 ()
!
, (38)
j1 () =
( b  z2V)
V
p

; j2 () =
( b+ z2V)
V
p

, (39)
h1 () =
( b  a2V)
V
p

; h2 () =
( b+ a2V)
V
p

, (40)
a =
(r     (2V =2))
2V
, (41)
b = ln

Vt
VB

, (42)
z =
r
(a2V )
2
+ 2r2V

2V
, (43)
x = a+ z: (44)
 () and  () denote the density of the standard normal distribution and the
cumulative distribution function, respectively.
A.2.1 The CDS Spread and Hedge Ratio
Using equation (37), the risk-neutral survival probability at horizon t is
q (t) = 1  F (t) (45)
= 1 
 
 (h1 (t)) +

V
VB
 2a
 (h2 (t))
!
:
Assuming constant interest rates, the CDS spread for maturity T is found by
inserting the survival probability (45) in equation (6), yielding
0 = c(0; T )
Z T
0
e rsq(s)ds+ (1 R)
Z T
0
e rsq0(s)ds: (46)
Integrating the rst term by parts, yields
0 =
c(0; T )
r

1  e rT q(T ) +
Z T
0
e rsq0(s)ds

+ (1 R)
Z T
0
e rsq0(s)ds, (47)
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where the integral   R T
0
e rsq0(s)ds is given by K(T ) in equation (36), following
Reiner & Rubinstein (1991). Then,
0 =
c(0; T )
r
 
1  e rT q(T )  c(0; T )
r
+ (1 R)

K(T ), (48)
which allows us to obtain a closed-form solution for the CDS spread
c(0; T ) = r (1 R) K(T )
(1  e rT q(T ) K (T )) : (49)
When determining the hedge ratio, we again follow Yu (2006) and approximate
the contract value in equation (7) by
(0; T ) = (c (0; T )  c)
Z T
0
e rsq (s) ds: (50)
=
c (0; T )  c
r
 
1  e rT q(T ) K (T ) ,
where c (0; T ) is a function of the value of equity S, and c is the CDS spread at
initiation.
Similar to CreditGrades, the hedge ratio is found using equation (8)
0 =
N
r
@c (0; T )
@S
 
1  e rT q(T ) K (T ) . (51)
However, in Leland & Toft (1996) the CDS spread is not an explicit function
of the equity value. Therefore, @c(0;T )
@S
is found numerically using
@c (0; T )
@S
=
@c (0; T )
@V
@V
@S
=
@c (0; T )
@V
1
@S
@V
: (52)
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics
This table reports sample characteristics for the 221 obligors. First, the average charac-
teristics are calculated for each obligor over time, then averaged across rms. The sta-
tistics are presented across the senior unsecured credit rating from Standard & Poors.
N is the number of obligors and spread is the 5-year composite CDS quote. While the
historical equity volatility HV is calculated from a 250-day rolling window of equity
returns, the implied equity volatility IV is inferred from 30-day at-the-money put op-
tions. The leverage ratio lev is total liabilities divided by the sum of total liabilities and
equity market capitalization, and size is the sum of total liabilities and equity market
capitalization in millions of dollars. Finally, corr is the correlation between changes in
the CDS spread and the equity value, averaged across ratings.
Rating N Spread HV IV Lev. Size Corr.
AAA 4 16 0.284 0.227 0.197 142,619 -0.107
AA 11 23 0.267 0.257 0.216 95,237 -0.050
A 80 40 0.305 0.293 0.354 40,274 -0.089
BBB 109 103 0.346 0.337 0.502 25,431 -0.124
BB 15 270 0.386 0.377 0.524 13,667 -0.056
B 1 355 0.554 0.555 0.564 34,173 -0.261
NR 1 172 0.229 0.219 0.450 11,766 -0.129
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Implied Parameters
This table reports the central implied parameters from CreditGrades and Leland &
Toft (1996), calibrated with a historical volatility HV and option-implied volatility IV .
While the rst measure is calculated from a 250-day rolling window of equity returns,
the latter is implied from 30-day at-the-money put options. The descriptive statistics for
the payout rate, global recovery and bond recovery are calculated across obligors. The
remaining variables are rst averaged over time, before the statistics are calculated across
obligors. The equity value, asset value and default barrier are measured in millions of
dollars. The upper three rows report the summary statistics of calibration targets from
the equity and equity options market. The global recovery rate is the mean global
recovery on all liabilities of the rm, while the bond recovery is the recovery rate on
the specic debt issue underlying the CDS. Finally, the payout rate is calculated from
historical dividend yields and relative interest expenses.
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Equity value 20,592 9,479 33,425 919 238,995
HV 0.329 0.313 0.106 0.175 0.989
IV 0.318 0.302 0.090 0.135 0.717
Panel A. CreditGrades HV
Asset value 29,895 14,839 46,655 1,360 337,381
Asset vol. 0.228 0.213 0.085 0.084 0.583
Default barrier 8,556 3,846 15,892 59 154,585
Global rec. 0.799 0.573 0.772 0.009 6.025
Panel B. CreditGrades IV
Asset value 26,189 12,914 40,418 1111 294,685
Asset vol. 0.232 0.227 0.079 0.0843 0.552
Default barrier 4,901 2,199 9,071 14 93,838
Global rec. 0.549 0.285 0.719 0.0097 5.715
Panel C. Leland & Toft HV
Asset value 34,837 18,100 53,727 2,008 417,807
Asset vol. 0.179 0.167 0.073 0.0382 0.446
Default barrier 12,445 5,939 32,871 591 374,849
Bond rec. -17.410 -0.443 129.611 -1,858 0.919
Payout rate 0.020 0.020 0.011 0 0.059
Panel D. Leland & Toft IV
Asset value 34,502 17,897 52,035 1972 373,672
Asset vol. 0.167 0.156 0.069 0.0077 0.413
Default barrier 12,762 6,105 33,360 593 364,376
Bond rec. -3.554 0.233 18.256 -222.69 0.835
Payout rate 0.020 0.020 0.011 0 0.059
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Table 6: Regression Results
This table reports the results from regressing capital structure arbitrage monthly per-
centage excess returns on the excess returns of equity and bond market portfolios. The
models underlying the strategy are CreditGrades CG and Leland & Toft (1996) LT ,
calibrated with a historical HV and option-implied volatility IV . The strategy is im-
plemented separately on investment grade and speculative grade obligors. S&PINDS
is the excess return on the S&P Industrial Index. LHIBAAI and LHHY BBI are the
excess returns on the Lehman Brothers Baa and Ba Intermediate Index, respectively.
The coverage is 24 months beginning October 2002 and ending September 2004. Stan-
dard errors are shown in parantheses, and ***, ** and * denote signicance at 1, 5 and
10 percent, respectively.
Strategy Intercept S&PINDS LHIBAAI LHHYBBI R2
CG HV Inv -0.57* 0.09 7.29 -14.40* 0.21
(0.28) (2.27) (7.06) (7.80)
CG HV Spec 1.96 -2.61 -53.73 77.25* 0.17
(1.48) (12.02) (37.30) (41.19)
CG IV Inv -0.15 6.13 -26.18** 12.77 0.35
(0.49) (3.96) (12.29) (13.58)
CG IV Spec 3.76 9.11 -45.06 81.11 0.16
(2.21) (18.00) (55.87) (61.70)
LT HV Inv -0.59** 1.51 -1.86 -8.44 0.32
(0.21) (1.74) (5.41) (5.98)
LT HV Spec 1.76 33.36 39.03 -40.44 0.08
(3.18) (25.91) (80.41) (88.80)
LT IV Inv 0.27 2.34 -13.22* 12.13* 0.32
(0.24) (1.98) (6.78) (6.14)
LT IV Spec 7.04*** -22.35 -21.91 121.69* 0.30
(2.22) (18.04) (55.98) (61.82)
39
Figure 1: Sears, Roebuck and Company
This gure illustrates the fundamentals behind capial structure arbitrage. In panel A,
we depict market CDS spreads together with model spreads in Leland & Toft (1996)
LT inferred from historical HV and option-implied volatilities IV . In panel B, the
corresponding spreads are depicted based on CreditGrades CG. Panel C depicts the
historical and option-implied volatility, where the rst is calculated from a rolling 250-
day window of equity returns, and the latter is inferred from 30-day at-the-money puts.
Finally, panel D illustrates the total market value of equity in millions of dollars.
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Figure 2: Time Warner
This gure illustrates the fundamentals behind capial structure arbitrage. In panel A,
we depict market CDS spreads together with model spreads in Leland & Toft (1996)
LT inferred from historical HV and option-implied volatilities IV . In panel B, the
corresponding spreads are depicted based on CreditGrades CG. Panel C depicts the
historical and option-implied volatility, where the rst is calculated from a rolling 250-
day window of equity returns, and the latter is inferred from 30-day at-the-money puts.
Finally, panel D illustrates the total market value of equity in millions of dollars.
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Figure 3: Motorola
This gure illustrates the fundamentals behind capial structure arbitrage. In panel A,
we depict market CDS spreads together with model spreads in Leland & Toft (1996)
LT inferred from historical HV and option-implied volatilities IV . In panel B, the
corresponding spreads are depicted based on CreditGrades CG. Panel C depicts the
historical and option-implied volatility, where the rst is calculated from a rolling 250-
day window of equity returns, and the latter is inferred from 30-day at-the-money puts.
Finally, panel D illustrates the total market value of equity in millions of dollars.
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Figure 4: Mandalay Resort Group
This gure illustrates the fundamentals behind capial structure arbitrage. In panel A,
we depict market CDS spreads together with model spreads in Leland & Toft (1996)
LT inferred from historical HV and option-implied volatilities IV . In panel B, the
corresponding spreads are depicted based on CreditGrades CG. Panel C depicts the
historical and option-implied volatility, where the rst is calculated from a rolling 250-
day window of equity returns, and the latter is inferred from 30-day at-the-money puts.
Finally, panel D illustrates the total market value of equity in millions of dollars.
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